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Rights of Adopted Children Under Pre-1949
Class Gifts

In Nunnally v. Trust Company Bank,' the Georgia Supreme Court
held constitutional Georgia's 1941 adoption statute,2 which provided that
the act of adoption should not affect the adoptive child's relationship
with anyone other than the adopting parents and the natural parents.
The 1941 act was challenged by two adopted children who, the court held,
were excluded from sharing in a class gift to "issue" of grandchildren at
the termination of a trust created by the adopting father's grandmother,
whose will became effective while the 1941 act was in force.
Testatrix executed her will in 1942 and died in 1945. The will created a
trust to pay income to her daughter for life and directed the trustee to
divide the trust assets at the daughter's death and distribute the shares
to the daughter's four children or to the "issue" of any children who may
have predeceased their mother. After testatrix' death, her grandson
adopted two sons. When testatrix' daughter died, the trustee brought an
action for construction of the will to determine whether the adopted children were takers under the gift to "issue." The trial court applied the
adoption law as of the time the trust terminated and held that the
adopted sons took as the grandson's issue. The Georgia Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, holding that the law as of the time the will took
3
effect should control.
On remand, the adopted children urged that the 1941 adoption statute
violated the equal protection clause by invidiously discriminating between children born into a family and those adopted into it. 4 The trial
court found that the 1941 adoption statute was patently invidious, but
that the fourteenth amendment was not violated because there was no
state action.5 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the decision, but did
so on the opposite reasoning that, while there was state action, the discrimination was rationally related to the valid state purpose of providing
for the orderly disposition of property.'
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

244 Ga. 697, 261 S.E.2d 621 (1979).
1941 Ga. Laws 300.
Nunnally v. Trust Co. Bank, 243 Ga. 42, 43, 252 S.E.2d 468, 469 (1979).
244 Ga. at 698-99, 261 S.E.2d at 623.
Id. at 697, 261 S.E.2d at 622.
Id. at 701, 261 S.E.2d at 624.

443

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32

Since adoption did not exist at common law, the problem of inheritance
and succession by adopted children is a relatively recent one. The Georgia
statute of 1941 resolved this problem to some extent by providing that
"[i]f the court is satisfied that a final order of adoption should be entered,
the court shall enter a decree of adoption, declaring the said child to be
the adopted child of the petitioner, and capable of inheriting his estate. ' 7
After removing the legal rights and obligations of the natural parents, the
act provided that "[t]o all other persons the adopted child shall stand as
if no such act of adoption had been taken."' Under the 1941 act, Georgia
courts held that an adopted child could not inherit from the adopting
parents' relatives unless expressly included under a willY
Beginning in 1949, however, Georgia law has made the act of adoption
effective as to all persons. The statute was amended to provide that an
"adopted child shall be considered in all respects as if it were a child of
natural bodily issue of petitioner or petitioners, and shall enjoy every
right and privilege of a natural child of petitioner or petitioners to inherit
under the laws of descent and distribution in the absence of a will and to
take under the provisions of any instrument of testamentary gift, bequest, devise or legacy unless expressly excluded therefrom."1 The supreme court sanctioned a broad reading of the 1949 amendment when it
held that the adoption of a child worked a revocation of the adopting
parent's will because the act of adoption "is the equivalent in law of the
birth of a child." '
With the change in the adoption statute, it was inevitable that questions would arise as to the rights of children adopted after the 1949
amendment under instruments which became effective before the amendment. Oddly enough, the question seems to have first appeared in Georgia
in a controversy over the effect of a similar change in Pennsylvania law.
In Carnegie v. First National Bank,12 the supreme court held that
Georgia law determined whether the earlier or the later Pennsylvania law
governed. The court said that the intent of the testator controlled on that
7. 1941 Ga. Laws 305.
8. Id. at 306.
9. 244 Ga. at 698, 261 S.E.2d at 623. In Comer v. Comer, 195 Ga. 79, 23 S.E.2d 420
(1942), the excluded child was adopted by one of testator's children, who died, and thereupon the child was adopted by another of testator's children.
10. 1949 Ga. Laws 1157. The 1949 act survives in substantially the same form at GA.
CODE ANN. § 74-413 (Supp. 1980). The act became effective August 25, 1949, thirteen
months after the adoption of Winship Nunnally III on July 20, 1948, and four months
before the adoption of Berry Nunnally on December 17, 1949. Brief for Petitioner at 2,
Trust Co. Bank v. Nunnally, No. C-39800 (Fulton Sup. Ct., June 8, 1978).
11. Thornton v. Anderson, 207 Ga. 714, 64 S.E.2d 186 (1951).
12. 218 Ga. 585, 129 S.E.2d 780 (1963). Like Nunnally, this case dealt with the rights of
an adopted son of a testatrix' grandson.

19801

RIGHTS OF ADOPTED CHILDREN

issue and found such intent in the following language: "said trust shall
then terminate and the whole or any portion thereof remaining unsold
shall be vested, but not before, absolutely in such persons and for such
estates and proportions as would take the same under the intestate laws
of the State of Pennsylvania had I died intestate possessed
thereof. ... "" Accordingly, the court held that Pennsylvania law as of
the termination of the trust should be followed in determining the
remaindermen.
In Brown v. Trust Co.," the supreme court was faced squarely with the
question as it arose under Georgia law. Admitting that the intention of
the testator was not so clear as in Carnegie, the court was still able to
gather from the four corners of the trust instrument that the law at the
termination of the trust controlled."' But the court went on to hold that
where a trust is created so as to terminate at some future date when a
class of beneficiaries is to be determined, unless the trust instrument itself provides expressly that a statutory rule other than that in effect at
the date of termination shall be applied, then the statutory rule in effect
at the date of the termination of the trust shall be applied.1
Five years later, the holding in Brown was disapproved by dictum in

Warner v. First National Bank.17 Although the will in Warner became
effective after the 1949 amendment, the court went out of its way to disapprove Brown under the more general rule that a testator's intent is to
be given effect whenever possible. The court found it "more logical to
assume that a testator intends for the law in effect on the date of his
death to control the disposition of his property under his will."1 " Reversing itself, the court said that "in the absence of an express contrary intention, a will is to be construed according to the law in effect at the
testator's death."1 The question arose again in the first appearance of
Nunnally.' The court applied the dictum in Warner without analysis
and, since testatrix' will expressed no intention regarding the law to be
used in its construction, the court held that the law in effect at her death
controlled.'
13. Id. at 589, 129 S.E.2d at 784 (emphasis in original).
14.

230 Ga. 301, 196 S.E.2d 872 (1973). The gift was to nieces and nephews of the testa-

tor, who died in 1948.
15. Id. at 303, 196 S.E.2d at 874.
16. Id.
17. 242 Ga. 661, 251 S.E.2d 511 (1978).
18. Id. at 664, 251 S.E.2d at 513.
19. Id. (emphasis added).
20.

243 Ga. 42, 252 S.E.2d 468 (1979).

21. Id. at 43, 252 S.E.2d at 469.
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When Nunnally appeared before the supreme court the second time, 21
the adopted sons sought to have section 11 of the 1941 act declared unconstitutional as violating the equal protection clause of the United
States and Georgia Constitutions. In analyzing this contention, the court
considered Lalli v. Lalli,2 3 in which the United States Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to a statute conditioning the rights of
illegitimates to inherit from their fathers. The standard set forth in Lalli
was "whether the statute's relation to the state interests it is intended to
promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality contemplated by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2 4 This almost toothless standard could be applied by the Georgia court because the classification created by the adoption statute did not affect or include any suspect categories such as race,
which would require strict scrutiny.
The court pointed out that its conclusion could not be based merely
upon any lack of wisdom in the legislature's choice. The court said that
the state has an interest in the orderly disposition of property, which interest is advanced by its laws of succession. These laws may properly be
based on the presumed intentions of decedents that their property pass
within their bloodlines, instead of to an adopted child who is brought into
the family by the affirmative act of the adopting parents.2 5 The court concluded that the 1941 adoption statute, like the statutes denying heir status to sons- and daughters-in-law, is not irrational as related to the state
objective of orderly disposition." Therefore, there was no invidious dis2
crimination in the 1941 statute. 7
The court in Nunnally took a dogmatic tone towards those who would
criticize the state's system of inheritance, saying that "it is solely within
the province of the state to prescribe for such succession as it deems necessary. "S Traditionally that has been so, but the state must be rational in
the application of its system. Lalli, which the court cited for the general
meaning of the equal protection clause, did not hold that a state could
provide for arbitrary disposition of property by inheritance, however orderly. The statute in Lai required certain proof of paternity before an
illegitimate could inherit from its father. In upholding this proof requirement, the Supreme Court found that it was rationally related to the

22. 244 Ga. 697, 261 S.E.2d 621 (1979).
23. 439 U.S. 259 (1978). The authority of Lalli, at least as to its particular factual setting, may not be long-lasting; the decision was 5-4 and only three members joined in the
opinion of the court.
24. Id. at 273.
25. 244 Ga. at 699-701, 261 S.E.2d at 623-24.
26. Id. at 701, 261 S.E.2d at 624.
27. Id. at 702, 261 S.E.2d at 625.
28. Id. at 699-700, 261 S.E.2d at 624.

19801

RIGHTS OF ADOPTED CHILDREN

447

state's goal of having orderly disposition of property by avoiding fraudulent claims of heirship.9 Given that adoption is a matter of judicial decree, an adopted child would have none of the proof problems contemplated by the statute in Lalli. Therefore, the concept of orderly
disposition of property, as used in that case, may not be applicable to
laws restricting the inheritance rights of adopted children. The court did
not explain why it would be more orderly to exclude, rather than include,
adopted children as takers under class gifts.
The only issue presented in Nunnally was whether section 11 of the
1941 act was unconstitutional on its face. The court did not discuss, and
the parties apparently did not raise, the issue of whether the 1941 act was
unconstitutionally applied to the son adopted under the 1949 act. He
might have contended that the state treats similarly situated people unequally when it allows some children adopted under the 1949 act to take
under testamentary class gifts and refuses to allow other children to take
these gifts, simply because of the date of the testator's death. In treating
Nunnally strictly as a will construction case, to be governed by the intent
of the testator under the general rule, the court ignored Berry Nunnally's
rights as based upon his status under the 1949 statute. That status was of
"natural bodily issue"" of the grandson. To deny such a child the benefits of a class gift to the "issue"' of the grandson on the ground that the
state presumes that the testatrix did not intend to include the adopted
children does not seem to serve any state purpose at all. Certainly it does
not serve the goal of the orderly disposition of property. It would be
much easier for the state to determine whether a child was adopted under
the 1949 amendment than to determine whether a testator "expressed"
an intent to allow the law at the termination of the trust to control.
It would not do to criticize the court too harshly on this point, since the
issue apparently was not considered. It is appropriate, however, to repeat
and re-emphasize criticisms of the Georgia adoption law made by one
commentator."2 Taking a child completely out of one family and placing
him into another is a very complicated business and the laws regulating
this process have not been carefully conceived or written. The legislature,
while admittedly working in a piecemeal fashion to patch these laws together, has at least moved towards the goal of complete integration of the
adopted child into its new family. The Georgia courts, on the other hand,
have favored the application of rules of construction over the spirit and

29. 439 U.S. at 268-71.
30. 1949 Ga. Laws 1157, 1158.
31. 243 Ga. at 43, 252 S.E.2d at 469. The language of the will was arguably broader than
that of the statute.
32. Comment, Domestic Relations-The Legal Consequences of Adoption in Georgia
-Inheritance Rights and Wrongful Death Actions, 23 MERCER L. REV. 1003 (1972).
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apparent intent of the statutes.3 The results, as in Nunnally, can sometimes be what no one intended.
THOMAS

33.

Id. at 1009.

M.
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